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Abstract 
Purpose 
A section of project management literature attributes overruns to estimators’ deceit and delusion. 
An example of this is Flyvbjerg’s theorization of strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias. 
To show that such a notion is not true entirely, the study elicits evidence relating to how costs of 
projects often fluctuate erratically as prices of construction materials change throughout contract 
cycle times. The purpose of the study is to examine the causal relationships between persistent 
changes in prices of construction materials and project’s outturn costs.  
Research Design 
We obtained and analysed price data of construction materials published in a Nigerian national 
daily in the 16 years between 2000 and 2015. Additional data were obtained from a quantity 
surveying firm to validate the archival data on material prices, and to compare the firm’s robust 
database of project estimates and the corresponding outturn costs of specific building elements 
(detailed in the study). The goal of the analysis is to explore spontaneity and causal impact in the 
relationship between changes in prices of construction materials and project costs. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Anderson-Darling tests were used to obtain the probability distributions of the causal 
relationships.  
Olatunji, O. and Orundami, A. and Ogundare, O. 2018. Causal relationship between material price fluctuation and project’s 
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Findings 
Findings show disproportionate positive correlations between changes in material prices and 
outturn costs in Nigeria. An important dimension to this however is that although fluctuations in 
material costs often trigger variations to project costs, outturn price only accounts for about one-
third of actual cost variabilities. Recovery of costs, not least profit making, under these conditions 
is a complex process.  
Value 
We conclude that dynamism in cost attributes is neither a deceit nor a delusion; understanding and 
tolerating them is not a systemic weakness, rather an essential key to project success and 
stakeholder satisfaction. Findings from the study also bring measured certainties to the 
transformation of variable costs into fixed price outcomes, an important consideration that will 
help contract estimators and project managers to understand the likelihood of fluctuation in 
material costs and how these might trigger variabilities in project costs.  
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Introduction 
Normative literature portrays project completion within pre-contract budget as a vital indicator of 
success (Ansar et al., 2014; Pinto and Mantel, 1990). However, the construction industry has had a 
rich history of not completing projects within budget. Ahiaga-Dagbui et al. (2015:865) describe this 
as a recurrent problem that researchers have struggled to unravelled appropriately. The authors 
argue there is no shortage of knowledge regarding why project estimates vary from actual costs. 
However, ideas are scant regarding how change agents metamorphose into chaotic outcomes in 
construction project costs. This critical knowledge gap in this is in connecting the why to how 
causations explain chaotic outcomes construction project cost management. Without this, 
estimators are unlikely to exercise accurate judgements in predicting and mitigating cost variability, 
either whilst developing estimates or when managing contracts. As Cantarelli et al. (2012) surmised 
this as a leading cause of inaccuracy in estimating processes.   
Estimators often predict the cost implications of resources needed to complete a project. Materials 
are a vital aspect of this. According to Omange and Udegbe (2000), construction materials account 
for up to 60 percent of project costs. Rowse (2009) agrees also that costs of construction materials 
have enormous effects on project costs. Rowse’s study shows that increases in the costs of vital 
construction materials are rampant, and have become onerous to predict. Elinwa and Buba (1993) 
conclude that fluctuations in material costs are a major cause of rise in costs of construction 
globally. One overarching challenge in this is that materials used for construction are diverse, and 
of varying sizes. As a result, they pose economic issues in multiple dimensions. When material 
prices change irregularly, their influence on outturn costs can become noticeable in outturn costs 
spontaneously.  
Many causality theorists often use probability theories to characterise causations by focusing on 
probable relationships between cause and effects (Greenland, 2011; Pearl, 2009). Love et al. (2012) 
have explained the application of this to construction cost management. They determined the 
likelihood of overruns occurring by using probability theory. However, how causations transform 
into overruns were not included in the analysis. Another work by Love et al. (2016a) argues that 
probability theory is an appropriate way to go in examining the relationship between fluctuation 
of materials prices and variability in project costs. The purpose of this study is to build on Love et 
al.’s works by using empirical data to identify the causal relationships between fluctuation of 
materials prices and project’s outturn cost. One objective of the study is to determine the rate of 
change and likelihoods of prices changes in select critical construction materials. The second 
objective is to investigate the impact of price changes on project’s outturn cost. 
Causality of cost variability 
Construction management literature is replete with information regarding reasons why project 
estimates vary from actual costs. Love and Smith (2016) identify such causes to include design 
errors and rework. Flyvbjerg (2008) and Cattell et al. (2010) think estimates differ from outturn 
costs because estimators are deceptive, delusional or are overly optimistic about uncertain 
situations that may come up when projects get underway. Baccarini’s (2005) opinion is different. 
The author underlines design and construction contingencies as another cause of variation in 
project costs. Huang et al. (2013) and Love et al. (2008) have added more dimensions to these, in 
the nature of clients’ soft requirements and contractor’s capacity to bifurcate [i.e innovate and 
create impromptu solutions during construction such that outturn situation of a project could 
satisfy clients further].  
Not least important, Olatunji (2010), Baloi and Price (2003), and Akintoye (2000) outline the 
impact of macro-economic factors on pre-contract estimates, and how these transform into a rise 
in outturn costs. Such factors include inflation [industry-specific cyclical inflation and general 
changes in price levels of commodities in the whole economy], interest rates [and costs of finance], 
foreign exhange rates, taxation, balance of trade, economic health of the construction sector, 
overall health of the economy and rate of resource employment. In addition, the works of Skitmore 
et al., in particular in Skitmore et al. (2007), Skitmore and Smyth (2009) Skitmore and Picken (2000), 
and Skitmore and Patchell (1990), to mention a few, are quite illuminating. The authors argue 
eloquently on how estimators often strive to capture the psychology of the bidding environments 
by projecting their estimates with the immediate intention to win rather than reflecting actual costs 
when projects gets underway. 
The implications of these study is such that construction estimating is not an ideal linear process. 
In particular, as often the case, if project costs are unpredictable by a linear relationship between 
resource inputs (such as labour, materials, plant and mark-up) and a stable rate of change in time 
value of money, the outcome is such that actual costs of projects will remain unknown until a time 
after practical completion. Many studies portray cost as a unitary element with a constant rate of 
change as though all the many inputs that go into construction have a single rate of change over 
time, in all locations, and in the same manner as the rate of change in other sectors of the economy. 
Example of these include Paasche model, Laspeyres model and Fisher’s model - see Balk (2010), 
Fleming and Tysoe (1991) and Seeley (1972).  
Other studies have built relative alternatives to these through time series analysis modelling. For 
instance, Ashuri and Lu (2010) used seasonal Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) 
and Holt–Winters exponential-smoothing to model construction cost index through the average 
monthly prices of construction activities in the form of time series analysis. Moon and Shin (2017) 
also modelled how construction costs behave when an economy fluctuates, in a similar manner to 
Ashuri and Lu’s. The centrality of these approaches is that the authors seem to assume that there 
is considerable certainty in how construction activities relate with economic indicators over time. 
In developing countries where economic indices are largely precarious, and the randomness of 
cost behaviours of construction input is overly chaotic, these linear models have only a limited 
chance of success. In addition, as pointed out in the works of Baccarini, Flyvbjerg, Love, Olatunji 
and Skitmore, amoral business behaviours also complicate the dynamism of construction costs, in 
that they are best studied as a characteristic system rather than a linear process.  
System thinking  
There is considerable material evidence in these extant studies to conclude that estimating science 
may only be an art rather than a definitive science. This is because, as the reviewed studies elicited, 
project estimates are not designed to reflect actual costs always. Studying the usual dichotomy 
observed between the two is a complex science (e.g. see Winch, 2010). Many authors have used 
various perspectives of system dynamics to provide scientific explanations to the phenomenon of 
cost variability [i.e. the ability of outturn costs to vary from pre-contract estimates]. A consensus 
that is evident in literature is that cost variability is a complex phenomenon. A study on causations 
of cost variability should consider the change trends in cost dynamism as a system issue i.e. looking 
into interdepencies between the system’s components rather than isolating each individual part 
(Cabrera et al., 2008; Checkland, 1999). Olaniran et al. (2017) noted this as the main difference 
between system thinking and traditional approaches in project management: the latter concentrates 
on individual components of a system, while the former focuses on interactions between and 
within constituent subsystems to trigger unique outcomes in outturn situations. By considering a 
bigger picture of outturn situation of a system, observable variations in the subsystems do not 
necessarily explain a system’s outturn situation.      
Practical implications of using system thinking to explain cost variabilities can be simplified. Cost 
management of construction projects is often shaped by interactions within project controls [i.e. 
resourcing, contracts, technologies and commitment to accountability]. In addition, it is important 
to consider how these are impacted by intrinsic variabilities within [i.e. multi-directional 
interconnectedness of] a project’s own sub-systems. External variables trigger changes to outturn 
costs also. In essence, system thinking helps to understand the interdependencies in how intrinsic 
and external components interact to transmit and return effects that they generate within a system 
and the resultant outcomes on the overall system (see Hung, 2008). For example, many studies 
have identified varying degrees of cost variability in construction projects. These include Odeck 
(2004) who analysed 420 samples of road projects and found 7.9% average overruns, which ranged 
from 59 – 183%. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) also found 50 – 100% overruns in 9 out of 10 projects he 
analysed, whilst Cantarelli et al. (2012) examined 29 road, 28 rail and 30 fixed link projects and 
found an average of 10.3% overruns overall but 18.5% in road projects only. Love et al. (2012) 
studies 58 transport infrastructure projects in Australia, and found the average cost overrun as 
13.8%. 
 
Systemicity of cost variability is a question of identifying and understanding why and how estimates 
vary from outturn costs (Checkland, 1999). Without these, it is onerous to manage and mitigate 
issues around causalities and causations of variabilities. Causes of cost variability are well reported 
in literature. However, there are only limited reports on how they occur and multiply in momentum 
as projects progress. For example, in a study involving 161 projects, Le-Hoai et al. (2008) identify 
thematic causes of cost overruns to include scope variations, delays and the tendency amongst 
various players to mislead as well as resourcing issues. None of these causes is cast-in-stone. 
Causatives can occur without hurting project budget. Aje et al. (2017) presented some project 
samples where delays in completion and scope variation did not influence pre-contract estimates. 
Ali and Kamaruzzaman (2010) conclude most estimates vary from outturn costs because of 
wrongful application of estimation methods that often lead to poor outcomes. The work of Daniel 
and Anny (1988) adds some depth to these also. The authors found that delays and cost variabilities 
can occur orthogonally, and that incessant fluctuation in prices of construction resources is a 
critical challenge of project success. Bromilow’s (1981) model adds price indexing, relative to 
inflation rate, as a dimension to this. By applying Checkland’s (1999) model on systemicity to how 
cost variability occurs, it is possible to draw a big-picture scenario that is convenient for an 
objective analysis regarding how the cost of numerous resources used for construction vary 
erratically, with or without recourse to coalesced inflation rates.    
Probability theory of causation 
Causation theorists have used probability theory to explain the causal relationships between two 
events (Gopnik and Wellman, 2012; Greenland, 2011). The theory suggests one event may cause 
a change in another event if there is probabilistic association in the relationship between the two 
events. For example, if outturn costs are built on cost of construction resources, there should be 
a considerable association in the probability that the latter can trigger changes in the former, and 
not vice versa. Probability theory of causation helps to understand the likelihood that changes in 
prices of construction resources will affect outturn costs of projects, and by how much.  
There could be several causations to how phenomena evolve in a systemicity, and the entropies 
effected by these are not least simplistic. Interdependencies between causations and the effects 
they create are quite complicated: between individual causations, and/or between groups of 
causations, likewise between effects as generated by noticeable causations, and as the generated 
effects further transform into causations that can generate further effects. Nonetheless, according 
to Love and Smith (2016), probabilistic causation theory can be used to forecast the occurrence of 
cost variability by considering price fluctuation as a main cause. 
Research Methodology 
Some research philosophies have been deployed to study causal dependencies between multiple 
variables. Some of these fit well into the aim of this study, which is to determine whether and how 
erratic changes in the prices of construction materials influence outturn costs of projects. Typically, 
most researchers find it convenient to study change using historical data. However, when change 
trend becomes chaotic i.e. variables (e.g. construction materials) are multifarious, and with erratic 
interdependencies, it is practically impossible to predict outcomes accurately by relying on 
historical data only. This is because no two projects are identical absolutely. Even where resources 
and productivity are the same, indirect and unrelated events as well as stakeholders’ motivation to 
succeed have often influenced costs differently. While it is popular amongst researchers to predict 
change propensity by considering resource costs only or outturn costs only, the practicality of 
research outcomes from these approaches have suffered. The reality of cost performance problems 
is such that these dimensions only explain causations of variability partially. For example, changes 
in prices of resources do not automatically lead to change in contract prices. If clients are not 
contractually obliged to consider every erratic movement in resource prices, what then in the 
relationship between erratic movements in price levels and what is the predictive capacity of such 
relationship? 
The approach taken in this study is to concentrate on basic materials used frequently for 
construction works across different trades. Examples of such include cement, aggregates and 
reinforcement used for concrete, walls, finishes and external works. As these items are used 
frequently, it is possible to figure out the impact of changes in their respective prices on outturn 
costs. It is also possible to find out how such changes impact the unit rates of work in the 
respective trades where they feature. For example, if cement and aggregates have the most erratic 
changes in cost and contribute the most significant volume in concrete work, and their prices 
change by a particular amount over a period of time, how much will the unit price of concrete 
change? Another dimension to this, considering clients’ tolerance of price volatility, is to examine 
outturn price that clients pay for actual fluctuations in the prices of construction materials.        
Sample Frame 
Five key components of building construction were considered for analysis. These are in-situ 
concrete, earthwork, masonry, roofing and reinforcement. Prices of materials used for the 
construction of these elements were studies. These include cement, fine aggregate, coarse 
aggregate, steel reinforcement bars, concrete block, laterite (earth-fill) and roofing sheet 
(aluminium, corrugated). Purposive sampling technique was used – this is often used when a 
selection of a small unit of the whole is built on the assumption that the selected small sample will 
offer same features as whole (see Neyman, 1934 and Kothari, 2004). Fluctuations in the prices of 
these materials were considered for the 64 quarters in the 16 years between 2000 and 2015. The 
data on this were collected from price databases, reported monthly in the Guardian, a prominent 
national newspaper in Nigeria. Guardian’s methodolody focuses on obtaining average retail prices 
of saundry construction materials from Nigeria’s major metropolis. Data on outturn costs and 
basic rates were also collected from consultant quantity surveyors. These are historical data from 
their past projects, quarterly averages taken the same way as prices of materials. 
These sources are appropriate for this study because majority of construction businesses in most 
developing countries are indigenous firm, mostly small in size; and they only source retailers. 
Differentiations have not been made for location issues e.g. logistics, storage and terrain; volume 
of trade, e.g. trade discounts, supply efficiecies; applications and methods e.g. complexities 
involved in actual applications of the materials; and contractors’ proprietary rights e.g. whether 
they own or make some of the materials themselves. These exclusions help to simplify the data 
capture and analysis. Further adjustments could be made to findings from a basic analysis on a 
case-based basis such that unqiue cases can be accommodated adequately. 
Results 
Change in Prices 
Evidence (see Table 1) suggests the prices of basic prices of construction materials in Nigeria have 
changed erratically every year. Cement, for example, rose in price by over 2.4% each year from 
2000 to 2005, but plummeted by more than 3% annually between 2006 and 2015. Fine aggregate 
has seen more radical changes in prices: less than 3% rise annually from 2000 to 2005, and more 
than 10% increase every year between 2006 and 2015. In contrast, changes in the prices of coarse 
aggregate have been in the opposite direction; from close to 10% yearly rise between 2000 and 
2005 to less than 8% between 2006 and 2010, and a gradual fall in price by nearly 1.5% yearly 
between 2011 and 2015. The cost of laterite earth fill also shows a downward trend, of nearly 8.5% 
cost reduction every year between 2000 and 2005, which reduced to just above 4% cost decline 
annually between 2006 and 2010, but a rise of close to 4.3% annually between 2011 and 2015. Bar 
reinforcement, 16mm diameter high yield bars in particular, was on a steep rise of more than 21% 
annually between 2000 and 2005 before the trend changed to just under 12% between 2006 and 
2010 but flattens to less than 0.4% price increase between 2011 and 2015. Apparently, rise in the 
prices of concrete block shows little or no relationship between the trend of change in cement and 
fine aggregate, the main components of blocks. Blocks rose by more than 26% every year between 
2000 and 2005 but plummeted by nearly 2% every year between 2006 and 2010 before rising by 
more than 2.5% between 2011 and 2015. Like steel reinforcement, corrugated aluminium roofing 
sheets also rose erratically every year. Between 2000 and 2005, the material rose by just under 17% 
annually; by just under 11% yearly between 2006 and 2010 and by close to 7% annually between 
2011 and 2015. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Causal relationships 
The change phenomenon in the prices of construction materials evidenced in Table 1 is frequent, 
persistent and random; suggesting an entropic situation, unpredictable and in a persistent slide into 
chaotic disorderliness. How do many items that change erratically combine into stable or fixed 
budget over a period of time in contract cycle times as clients may expect, and how do these 
interact and impact each other? Further analysis, Pearson’s moment correlation, was undertaken 
to explore the causal relationships between prices of construction materials, the unit price when 
these items are estimated into a project budget, and the actual amount (outturn cost) paid for each 
unit item in which these items have been used (see Table 2). Findings show changes in the costs 
of cement and aggregates trigger significant changes to the budgets of all cement-based items (e.g. 
concrete, concrete blocks and block-walling), but not to actual amounts paid by clients for these 
items. A noticeable exception to this is where there are contractual variations to the budgets of 
these items (e.g. where pre-contract budgets have become invalid as a result of major changes to 
work scope or a significant fluctuation in resource prices acknowledged by client). For example, 
when the price of cement increases significantly, budget estimates and outturn costs of concrete 
items (e.g. in-situ concrete, retail prices of concrete blocks and block-walling) will increase 
automatically, mostly likely at a rate not defined by the change in the prices of cement, aggregate 
and blocks. When there are sporadic reductions in the prices of these items, budget items and 
outturn costs may remain unchanged.  
Another key finding noted in the analysis is the strong correlation between steel products (e.g. bar 
reinforcement, roofing sheet), laterite and cement. Cement and steel products are largely imported 
products, susceptible to the fluidity of international market prices. Although these items are 
unrelated, not least laterite which is an abundant local material, rises in the costs of cement and 
steel products have often occurred simultaneously. Apparently, there is unifying factor in these 
unrelated but consistent change events e.g. foreign exchange and monetary policies. When local 
materials show spontaneous reactions to these (e.g. laterite and aggregates showing significant 
correlation with budget estimates of concrete and, budget estimates and outturn costs steel 
products). Apparently, they are also impacted by unique inflationary trends, perhaps seasonal pulls 
in demand and supply.    
 
Insert table 2 
 
A linear regression model was developed to explain the relationship between these episodic change 
events between construction material, budget estimates and outturn costs (see equation 1). Result 
shows [R = 0.724] 72.4% of outturn costs of concrete work is explained by prices of cement, fine 
and coarse aggregate, and budgeted rate of concrete work. The proportion of variability of 
independent variables explained in the model is 52.3% [R2 = 0.523], while the adjusted R squared 
value, the degree of completeness of the model, is 49.1%. 
 
Concrete(Otn) = 3942.653 + 0.382Ce – 0.110FA + 0.970C_rate – 0.085CA            (Equation 1) 
Where Concrete(Otn)= outturn concrete cost; Ce = bagged cement (50kg); FA = fine aggregate 
(5 tons); CA = contract rate for concrete, 25MPa; CA = coarse aggregate, 5 tons. 
 
Significance of variance between groups of variables was also examined. At a significance level (p-
value) less than 0.05, results show the contributions of the independent variables are not equal. 
50% outturn cost of in-situ concrete is explained by changes in the price of cement, and that an 
increase in the price of cement above current prices may increase the outturn cost of in-situ 
concrete by 17.3%. However, a change in the prices of aggregate impacts outturn costs of in-situ 
concrete differently; an increase in price of fine and coarse aggregate will explain negative 
variations in outturn cost of concrete by up to 48% and 54% respectively. 
 
Probability distribution fitting for material price fluctuations  
Best fit probability distribution of the select construction materials used for the study was obtained 
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling models (see Table 3). Probability density and 
cumulative distribution functions were obtained from this to predict the likelihood of fluctuation 
in price of the materials as well as the outturn costs (see Table 4). Analysis shows the probability 
of 15% increase above the yearly mean price of cement is 38% [(P(X>X1), 0.38)]. With a 
probability delimiter set at 95%, there is a 95% chance that a bag of cement, 50kg in weight, will 
increase to ₦2,400. The probability that the cost of fine aggregate will increase by 15% above 
yearly average is 31% [(P(X>X1), 0.31)], a 93% chance that price of 5 tons of fine aggregate will 
increasing to ₦23,000. For coarse aggregate, the probability that the price will rise by 15% increase 
above the yearly average is 35% [(P(X>X1), 0.35)], a 93% chance that the price of 5 tons of coarse 
aggregate will increase to ₦30,000. Similar outcomes were obtained for 225mm wide concrete 
blocks and 16mm diameter high yield reinforcement bars and reported in Figures 4 and 5 
respectively. The probability that their prices will rise by 15% is 43% and 45% respectively. 
Analysis shows a 92% chance that the price of 225mm wide concrete blocks will increase to ₦160, 
and a 69% chance that a ton of 16mm diameter high yield reinforcement bars will rise to ₦160,000 
after 2015. 
Insert table 3 
Insert table 4 
 
Same procedure was repeated to predict fluctuations in outturn costs of line items in budgets also. 
Analysis shows a 19% probability that clients will pay 15% more than yearly average of pre-
contract estimates for blockwork, and an 89% chance that building a unit of block wall area will 
increase to ₦3000. There is also a probability of 2% that clients will pay 10% more than yearly 
average of pre-contract estimates for 25MPa in-situ concrete [(P(X>X1), 0.02)], and a 98% chance 
that the unit price of the item will not exceed N30,000 after 2015. For 16mm diameter high yield 
reinforcement bars, analysis shows a 16% probability that outturn cost will rise by 10% above the 
yearly average [(P(X>X1), 0.16)], and a 90% chance that clients will only pay up to ₦250,000 for 
every ton of 16mm diameter high yield bars completed after 2015. 
Discussion of Results 
Numerous types of construction materials are used for construction, the prices of which change 
variously in a manner that is nearly impossible to predict. There are external dimensions to this 
too: random or chaotic behaviours of costs in construction projects are often impacted by other 
forms of variables such as plant and labour resources, planning and methods, and on-costs. All of 
these vary erratically also. In addition, Leslie’s (2015) review of causations of overruns in 
megaprojects identifies the role of unrelated events in cost performance of projects. The reporter 
considered the works of prominent authors on this subject to conclude that events such as 
international politics and markets, culture, indirect costs from project environment and events in 
other sectors (e.g. finance, manufacturing, logistics etcetera) all play roles in how dynamic 
behaviours of costs aggravate. Neither clients nor contractors are able to predict moments of 
change around these, and how the resultant situations could impact project outcomes. This basic 
truth is rarely well reported in construction management literature.  
A huge volume of work has been reported on overruns. Ahiaga-Dagbui et al. (2015:865) think the 
subject is over-researched however research outcomes are shallow and misleading. For example, 
there is hardly a shortage of knowledge on overrun causatives (why overruns occur). Intellectual 
narratives on causations make no complete sense (and can only impact outcomes poorly) unless 
causality [i.e. how causal agents interrelate with themselves and with effects to transform into 
noticeable outcomes] is understood. Evidence put forward in this study shows change attribute of 
prices of major construction materials is multidirectional and this often remains erratic even during 
business (contract) cycle times. Baloi and Price (2003), Ogunsemi and Jagboro (2006), and Olatunji 
(2010) have all noted uncertainty around the dynamism of cost variables is the single most 
important reason why actual costs of project are often unpredictable. Ali and Kamaruzzaman 
(2010), Cantarelli et al. (2012) and Flyvbjerg (2007; 2008; 2011; 2014; 2016) see cost variability, 
perhaps caused by fluctuations in resource prices, and changes to work scope, as poor practice of 
estimation resulting from faulty methods and deceptive conducts.        
This study reports a relationship between fluctuations in prices of construction material, pre-
contract budget and outturn costs; implying surges in budget estimates and overruns can be traced 
to fluctuations in resource prices. For example, when the prices of cement and aggregates rise, 
budget estimates for concrete work will rise also. However, the corresponding rise in budget 
estimates for concrete work may not be explained fully by the rate of change in the constituent 
resources. This is because apart from simultaneous changes in other cost variables (e.g. costs of 
plant and labour, on-cost items and risk exposures to external markets), contractors have had to 
respond to onerous risks transferred to them by extant contract conditions. An example of such 
situation is established in the results: clients do not consider erratic behaviours of costs often. 
Estimators can only account for recent and perceived future rises in prices of cement when budgets 
for cement-based products (e.g. concrete, block walling and finishes) are being developed. Beyond 
this, there is no significant correlation between outturn costs and rate of change in cement prices. 
Where cost recoveries are impossible (e.g. when the gap between price fluctuations is not 
accounted for in outturn payment, or delay in payments) consequences include dissipation in 
quality of work and rework (Frimpong et al., 2003). Alao and Jagboro (2017) concluded that this 
is a leading cause of project abandonment by indigenous contractors. 
Another dimension to the results under interdependencies between fluctuations in the prices of 
construction materials and outturn costs is the vulnerability of materials that are available locally 
to cost changes in global (imported) materials. For example, results show a strong correlation 
between global commodities such as cement and steel, and laterite earth-fill. A typical explanation 
for this is supported by Olatunji’s (2010) findings on the impact of macro-economic variabilities 
on construction costs. Such include foreign exchange rates, energy costs e.g. rise in cost of fuel, 
inflation and aggregated impact of government policies relating to the protection of the local 
market against risk exposures coming from international markets. For example, a rise in crude 
prices in the global market means a rise in pump prices of fuel products. Where this is exacerbated 
by a fall in foreign exchange rates or fuel availability issues, resulting in a rise in landing costs of 
fuel, the cost of aggregates will rise concurrently as global materials such as cement and steel 
products.  
Through probability distribution fitting analysis, results show likelihoods of change in the prices 
of construction materials and outturn costs of budgeted line items. For example, there is 15% 
chance that the price of cement will increase by 38% after 2015; fine and coarse aggregates, 31% 
and 35% respectively; concrete block and steel reinforcement, 43% and 45% respectively. These 
are quite significant, even without considering other variabilities such as logistics, storage and 
protection, inventory costs and construction methods. Further results suggest clients are unlikely 
to accommodate these changes. Findings show there is only 15% chance that clients will pay 19% 
more than 2015 costs for block walling despite the possibility of the prices of cement, fine 
aggregates and blocks rising by 38%, 31% and 43% respectively. The situation is more onerous 
for concrete; clients will only pay 1% more than 2015 estimates despite the possibility of cement, 
fine and coarse aggregates rising in prices by 38%, 31% and 35% respectively. Prices of 
reinforcement may rise by 45%, findings show clients are only keen to raise payment by 12%.  
Conclusion 
This research investigates cost variability in construction projects by exploring causal relationships 
between fluctuations in prices of select construction materials and likelihood of variabilities in 
budget estimates and outturn costs. Evidence from the results show changes in prices of 
construction materials are chaotic, and are further exacerbated by other factors including amoral 
behaviours of stakeholders and events that may be unrelated to projects. In addition, these events 
happen, not as a result of estimators’ and contractors’ evil or incompetence, rather an obvious 
‘zemblanity’ which much of the research community focusing on overrun causality has refused to 
acknowledge. Yet the practical implications of this are significant. Without a proper understanding 
of how resource price fluctuations trigger systemic variability in project costs, not much progress 
will be made in finding solutions to change events, especially how change agents interact amongst 
themselves and transform into effects, and how they interact with incipient effects to transform 
into noticeable outcomes in projects. In addition, evidence from the research suggests the risk 
avoidance practice in which clients hold contractors accountable for resource price fluctuations is 
an onerous cultural problem. The industry and the research community must work together to 
solve this; by way of enlightenment, creating models that reward efficiency and price intelligence, 
and cost management systems that are open and transparent.  
Outcomes reported in this study are limited by scope and location. Only price data of six key 
materials have been reported, although a typical construction project could require several 
hundreds of materials, not only different in type but also in quality, application and size 
requirements. Data used for the study were collected from a developing country where measures 
to control inflation and public institutions have remained imperfect. Suppliers and manufacturers 
did not provide the data. Retailers were not contacted individually also. Nonetheless, the 
methodology used by national newspaper that have published the data regularly over several 
decades were considered satisfactory. This is because it is incumbent that the newspaper publishers 
must have contacted many retailers mostly from different locations around Nigeria’s major capital 
cities. Rebates, warranties, discounts, application efficiencies and other cost-saving initiatives have 
not been included in the analysis, as well as data on human and plant resources and on-cost items.            
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